09 June 2009

Lessons Learned

From dodbuzz.com

Israeli Lessons on Hybrid War

Israeli Lessons on Hybrid War
By Greg Grant Friday, June 5th, 2009 8:14 pm

Select quotes...

years of low-intensity conflict operations against Palestinian terrorist organizations, the occupation, damaged the military’s ability to shift gears and cope with a different fight of the high-intensity kind. The Israeli army had adopted a “low-intensity conflict mindset” that influenced corresponding tactical procedures including command and control, logistics support and casualty evacuation. What works in a low-intensity environment does not, typically, in a high-intensity one, and the IDF was slow to change out of the LIC “mode.”

The army didn’t follow high-intensity combat procedures, such as only advancing at night and was late to prepare for ground operations, “which was essential for decisive outcome in this type of conflict.

In the years leading up to the war, the Israeli army had trained less in combined arms operations and subsequently lost vital combat skills, mainly at the division and brigade level. It also gave too low a priority to updating major war plans.

The IDF’s “operating concept” used unclear terms and was impossible to implement against a non state enemy. The operating concept he references is “Effects Based Operations,” which emphasized airpower’s ability to achieve decisive effects.

Say it with me. 'Fourth Generation War is a crock of shit and conventional warfare is still relevant, forget that at your peril.'